This thesis examines the requirements of the land force commander for timely intelligence of the battlefield when engaged in combat operations with a highly mobile enemy. The capabilities of the organic Army agencies and USAF Tactical Reconnaissance forces are addressed in light of a typical enemy maneuver and air defense environment. The thesis is UNCLASSIFIED. The theoretical capabilities of the enemy have been extracted from Field Manuals 102 and 103, relating to Aggressor, The Maneuver Enemy, the characteristics of whom are used by the U.S. Army in training exercises. Characteristics of all the systems available to the land force commander were extracted from unclassified Field Manuals, pamphlets, and recently declassified test reports. General conclusions reveal that: 1. the commander will not be capable of acquiring timely order of battle and target acquisition intelligence throughout most of his areas of interest and influence. 2. Intelligence derived through existing Tactical Reconnaissance procedures will not be sufficiently timely to meet the requirements of a typical tactical situation. 3. Developmental USAF capabilities for timely surveillance /reconnaissance could be sufficient to collect and process tactical information, and the US Army Battlefield Information Control Center could be sufficient to produce timely intelligence, provided the two capabilities were integrated.

ADA089530; N19052.172-2 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)