Since the end of the Second World War most modern armies have been conventionally structured and equipped to fight high intensity conflicts against like armed nations. Congruently, there has also been many low intensity conflicts in which similarly equipped nations found themselves engaged. In response to these low intensity conflicts, nations employed the forces available to them, which were generally armor and mechanized in nature. The result of these conflicts have made the relevance of heavy armor, specifically the tank on the asymmetric battlefield a point of contention for the last half century. The question this poses is: How were conventionally equipped, tank heavy forces employed in COIN operations and were they successful? To determine this, examples of French operations in Indo China, the United States' involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq, Canadian Afghan operations, and Russia's combat in Chechnya and Afghanistan will be analyzed. The focus for each case study will discuss the situation and threat, tactics used by the counterinsurgency force, modifications to vehicles or doctrine, and the ultimate determination of either success or failure of the tank in the conflict. The results of this study are that the combined arms team provides the commander with a lethal and capable force. The initiative is gained by commanders who seek the non-conventional employment of armor despite the situation or terrain. Task organized units or units that train with different branches enjoy greater success with less friction than units task organized under fire. Lastly, units possessing a more deployable package have a greater initial effect on the battlefield.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)