This study attempts to analyze the causes and results of U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict since World War II in three case studies to determine if there are specific indicators that would suggest the nature of future involvement of the United States in low intensity conflict situations. The investigation is focused on an analysis of historical experience within the context of low intensity conflict as depicted on the conflict spectrum and defined within the study. The case--studies include the entire Greek Civil War from 1947 to 1949, the first weeks of the Dominican intervention in 1965 and U.S. involvement in South Vietnam during the advisory effort, 1961 to mid-1965. Investigation reveals that there are many commonalities as well as disparities among different case studies of low intensity conflict. Further investigation of these case studies with respect to current U.S. doctrine for internal defense and development suggests that the current doctrine is viable, and entails more than a simple military solution to a case of low intensity conflict. Several conclusions are reached which may influence future U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict. These conclusions are concerned with Communist containment, rules of engagement, country team coordination, internationalization efforts, external support and U.S. Army doctrine

AD A147 809 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.