This thesis explores the ability of Massachusetts to conceive, launch, and execute offensive expeditions in relation to the failure of the 1779 Penobscot Expedition. This thesis seeks to highlight the difference between the colony's success in building and sustaining expeditions with its inability to overcome the limitations of its provincial army system. A secondary question focuses on how the army's source of soldiers, the militia, affected the outcome of the colony's expedition. This study reviews Massachusetts' colonial military operations in order to track its evolutionary growth in provincial armies beginning with King Philips' War through the Seven Year's War. Based on an analysis of the historical capabilities of Massachusetts' provincial armies, this thesis reviews the constraints of the provincial army system on the Penobscot Expedition and its leadership.

ADA 547183 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)