During the Interwar period, the Soviet theory of "deep operations," like Soviet military science as a whole developed in parallel with Soviet armed forces organizational reform, including rearmament and preparation for current threats. The determining factors which created favorable conditions for the emergence of the theory were rearmament and reorganization of the Red Army and the combat experience of previous wars of 20th century. However, Stalin's 1937-1940 repression impeded the development and application of the theory. At the same time in the Far East, a full-scale undeclared war developed between Japan and the Soviet Union. The 1939 war became the real battlefield for examining the Red Army, its capability to deploy combined joint forces, to organize comprehensive combat and logistic support of its troops, and to coordinate the efforts with the Mongolian People's Army. The 1939 military conflict in the Far East demonstrated the growth of the Soviet theory of the "deep operation," as well as the leadership talents of General Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov. This thesis explores aspects of the "deep operation" development and its application during the 1939 Soviet-Japanese military conflict in Mongolia.

ADA 524118 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)