The dominance of the U.S. Army's conventional capabilities has forced our adversaries to generate asymmetric techniques in order to marginalize our advantages. One technique they may pursue is to target our extensive use of information technology. The reliance our commanders place on the benefits of cyberspace, combined with the massive proliferation of hostile cyber tactics, suggests our tactical units are destined to face such a threat. When considering the consequences of not addressing this risk, lessons learned from the Battle of Kasserine Pass resonate. Though history provides numerous examples of units entering battle unprepared, Kasserine Pass is unique in that it was preceded by the innovation of a major combat capability; the tank and armored warfare. A tactical disaster, Kasserine Pass highlighted the vulnerability of the force during the critical time between an innovation's implementation and its institutionalization. The new concepts must be incorporated into doctrine, organizations, training, leader development, and materiel in order for Soldiers to utilize them on the battlefield. For those at Kasserine Pass, institutionalizing the innovation that eventually won the war came too late.

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