The thesis that air operations at night are evolving as doctrinal employment of air power for counterinsurgency is founded basically on the history of night air operations in Vietnam during the period 1962 through 1964. It became evident early in 1962 that the developing pattern of conflict in Vietnam was a repetition of the insurgency/counterinsurgency experiences of other countries in previous times. Without regard to other factors, it was apparent that, militarily, history was repeating itself in Southeast Asia. Insurgent activity was largely night oriented, and the counterinsurgent was ill-prepared to conduct effective ground or air operations against the illusive night-fighting guerrilla. Although the insurgent commonly exploits night for his terrorist activities, he does this not by choice but of necessity. An examination of basic factors and problems inherent in night military operations reveals the significant disadvantages which face both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. The simple inability to see in the dark and the resultant effect of complicating movement and control, increasing susceptibility to injury and fatigue, and prolonging the time which it takes to perform a military maneuver--these are the problems faced by the military man at night, regardless of his mission and irrespective of the environment in which he fights. Night is no less an enemy to soldiers on the ground than it is to airmen in the sky. Night, however, if examined as a potential ally, offers an environment which, when properly exploited, can be of tremendous value to both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. In Vietnam, this exploitation was practiced from the beginning by the Viet Cong with ever increasing success. The Factors of cover, concealment, secrecy, and surprise were utilized with devastating effectiveness by the Viet Cong in their mission of expanding communism into the Republic of South Vietnam. In response to the increasing enemy threat during the hours of darkness, the South Vietnamese and their American advisors began in mid 1962 to develop a capability to neutralize and eventually defeat the insurgents by shifting emphasis to counterinsurgent operations at night, both on the ground and in the air. From an inauspicious beginning in which the primary weapon and deterrent was the flareship, night air and ground operations expanded to include flareship-fighter strike teams and specially trained small unit ground forces meeting the Viet Cong in the environment which they (the Viet Cong) had chosen to exploit. During 1963, night air operations developed rapidly and the tools, tactics, and techniques which were to bring significant results in 1964 were developed. A statistical analysis of the air operations during 1964 illustrates beyond doubt that the employment of air power at night was evolving as a normal and, in fact, desirable utilization of this potent combat capability. The trends point unmistakably to a full realization of the part which airborne weapons and personnel can play in counterinsurgency when employed at night. During this same period, many tests and experiments were conducted in Vietnam to improve our night air capability, and tactics, techniques, and equipment used in other counterinsurgency wars were examined, to be used or discarded as dictated by the peculiarities of the Vietnamese battlefield. The value of using the night as a means to reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to an increasing Viet Cong antiaircraft capability was recognized and more and more ground and air operations were conducted in the newly emerging friendly environment of darkness. The evolution of night air operations in Vietnam occurred with relative celerity as both Army and Air Force men became aware of the potential advantages inherent in employing aircraft in support of offensive as well as defensive operations on the ground. An indication of this awareness has been manifested in increasing emphasis on the part of all the services on the use of air power at night. In Counterinsurgency warfare in the future, lessons learned in Vietnam, if remembered and if exploited, will serve as a doctrinal basis for immediate employment of night air operations as one of the most important and most lucrative methods of defeating insurgent forces. The use of air power at night is evolving and will continue to evolve as doctrine for unconventional warfare with the objective and ultimate result of providing a credible deterrent to communist insurgency. This deterrent is based on the capability to conduct effective military operations 'round the clock, utilizing balanced air and ground forces to defeat insurgency anywhere in the world.

ADA 371134 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)