This thesis attempts to evaluate the use of leadership principles by the two chief protagonists of the Battle of Saratoga in the Revolutionary War. Several ideas develop as corollaries to the chief theme: 1) Leadership principles will not of themselves insure victory. 2) Ignorance of their effect or their misapplication may contribute to the defeat of a military force. 3) Passage of time does not invalidate the principles of leadership. The criteria of leadership used are those set forth in Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100. Against these principles the actions of Lieutenant General John Burgoyne of the British Army and Major General Horatio Gates of the American Army are measured. Leadership is defined in terms of the environment, the leader, and the led, and the thesis presents data on each of these three topics. The presentation illustrates that no military engagement is of itself an isolated entity. The political environment in both Great Britain and the newly declared independent states of North America is reviewed. The political direction of the war, as well as the military chain of command on both sides, is discussed to show the influence which the political and military environment exerted on the chief protagonists. The qualities, conditions, and motivations of the subordinate officers and common soldiers, both British and American, are described, thus illustrating the characteristics of the forces the two major commanders led. Biographical data on Lieutenant General John Burgoyne of the British Army and Major General Horatio Gates of the Continental Army, the leaders at the Battle of Saratoga, prove these men to be distinct individuals possessed of personal ambitions, motivated by private concerns, and influenced by the environments in which they lived. The details of the British plan for the Campaign of 1777 and the preparations that were made for its execution are explained. A discussion of the plan is vital to an understanding of the Battle of Saratoga, because the original plan first proposed by General Burgoyne was altered. His execution of the resulting scheme, not wholly his own, was marred by defeat which may in some measure be attributed to the complexity of the plan and lack of coordination between the British Ministry, the commander-in-chief in America, and General Burgoyne himself. The preparations for the campaign of the Canada Army are also described, full responsibility for any inadequacies therein being directly attributed to General Burgoyne, who exercised undisputed total supervisory authority during the preparatory period. Since American plans and preparations, unlike those of the British, entailed only the relatively simple task of arranging to counter the enemy's moves, comparatively little attention is accorded to Colonial preliminaries. The application and misapplication of the principles of leadership by both major commanders is also discussed. Details are furnished to give an overall view of the conduct of the separate engagements of the Battle of Saratoga. The tactics employed by both major commanders are analyzed to indicate positive or negative application of leadership principles. Concluding this thesis is an evaluation of the leadership exercised from the inception of the plan of the campaign of the final denouement on the plains of Saratoga. The actions of both Gates and Burgoyne, as reviewed in the text of the thesis, are measured against each principle of leadership previously introduced from Department of Army criteria.

ADA 365132 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)