The peculiarities of northern offensive operations during the winter season are the subject of discussion of this thesis. The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with an understanding of the dynamic effects of environmental factors of the northern areas on offensive military operations and to point out the methods used to overcome, or reduce the significance of these effects. A thorough understanding of how and to what extent the environment affects operations is a prerequisite for the effective and efficient employment of military forces in a northern region. The first chapter is devoted to an examination of the physical factors of that part of the earth's surface that lies north of the Temperate Zone, or in more technical terms, the area north of the 50º isothermal line. Mountainous areas which lie within this line are omitted in that these areas require special considerations which are worthy of separate study. The topography, winter climate, vegetation, and cultural features of Canada, Alaska, Finland, and Eurasia are the principal areas of interest and research since the terrain in these land areas offers the best possibilities for the conduct of warfare. Chapter II is a discussion of those aspects of a cold environment which may affect the will of the soldier to fight or his capability to perform his job in an efficient manner. The first aspect considered is the physiological effects of the northern environment on personnel. This subject area includes the difficulty of the human body to acclimatize to the hostile climate of Arctic areas and the requirement for protective clothing and equipment to safeguard against the hazards of cold injury. Although this protective clothing proves most effective in protecting the body, the hampering action of these bulky garments serves to reduce individual efficiency. The efficiency of the individual is further reduced as the windchill factor increases. The remaining portion of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the mechanical aspects of frostbite and the psychological effects of cold weather environment. The psychological effects of the cold environment on personnel are less defined than are the physiological effects and consequently are more controversial. The minimum training requirements for an infantry division to successfully conduct operations in an arctic environment is the subject of Chapter III. A master training program is submitted for consideration. This program includes the indoctrination training that should be conducted at the division's home station, as well as the training requirements that must be completed after the division arrives at an arctic training site. Included in the discussion are individual, unit, and specialist training requirements. It is emphasized that the program outlined is the minimum training required, with additional training, when possible, being desired. Combat service support during the conduct of winter offensive operations in a northern environment is discussed in Chapter IV. The problems of logistical support are complicated by the difficulty of cross-country movement, widely separated and poor communications facilities, and the increase in logistical loads due to the special equipment needed by the infantry division in northern areas. Wheeled vehicles have been determined to be valueless for cross-country operations. Tracked vehicles should be substituted for wheeled vehicles that are expected to operate in the forward combat areas. Frequent task force operations will require the fragmentation of the support command. The tactical considerations for operations in northern areas during winter months is the last subject for discussion. The winter season, with its frozen lakes, streams, and muskeg swamps, presents the best period for the conduct of offensive operations. These frozen waterways often provide excellent avenues of approach and routes of communication due to their flat and smooth surfaces. The numerous lakes which dot the landscape of northern areas constitute ready-made landing areas for cargo aircraft and heliborne operations. One of the greatest limiting factors for infantry operations in the northern area is the difficulty of cross-country movement and the slowness of troop reaction time in accomplishing assigned tasks. Factors causing this delayed reaction time are discussed along with the importance of accurate and current meteorological data in decision making. The few communications facilities that do exist in the northern areas assume greater tactical significance than would be the case in a temperate zone environment. These rail and road facilities will often be designated as objectives for the infantry division. The widely separated nature of these facilities will frequently require the organization of independent task forces. The conclusion is reached that the considerations for the organization of a task force in the North are no different from the considerations in the Temperate Zone. The techniques used by a task force in the North to seize assigned objectives will be different from Temperate Zone operations, but the tactical principles for the conduct of the attack will remain the same. The basic conclusions reached as a result of this research are as follows: 1) The hostile environment of the Arctic is a dynamic and unrelenting force that will challenge the imagination, ingenuity, and physical resources of even the best trained military units that may be committed in this area of the world. 2) The winter season is the most favorable season for the conduct of military operations in the northern areas. Within the cold weather season, the period January to March offers the best possibilities for military operations because of improved trafficability of terrain. 3) The human body does not possess the physical capability to acclimate to extreme cold temperatures as it does to extreme hot environments. 4) The large amounts of cumbersome clothing required for protection in the Arctic results in a loss of efficiency of the individual soldier due to a decrease in manual dexterity. 5) Military operations in the Arctic require the ultimate in physical conditioning of the participating troops. 6) A minimum of nine weeks of intensive preparatory training are required to ready an infantry division in the temperate zone for deployment to a combat theater in the northern areas. 7) The wheeled vehicle does not possess a satisfactory cross-country capability in the snow covered terrain of the Arctic. 8) The widely separated and poor communications systems, the difficulty of cross-country movement, and the increase in amounts and types of supplies required in northern areas tend to intensify and complicate logistical problems associated with arctic operations. 9) When practical, unit distribution of supplies will be preferred over supply point distribution during operations in the North. 10) Offensive military operations in northern warfare will not have extended, solid frontlines, but instead will consist of independent task forces of battalion, brigade, and in some instances, division size. 11) The considerations for tailoring of independent task forces for northern operations will be no different than those considerations for operations in the Temperate Zone. 12) Current and accurate meteorological data is essential for successful operations in northern regions. Temperature, wind, precipitation will influence the commander' decision and concept of operations. 13) The ROAD infantry division, as currently equipped for operations in a temperate environment, does not have the capability to conduct offensive operations in northern region during the winter season. Equipment lists must be modified to reflect substitution of tracked vehicles for wheeled vehicles which are expected to operate in the forward combat areas where few roads exist. Additional changes in the equipment lists are necessary to provide the division with the special items of cold weather equipment to cope with the severe and hostile environment of northern regions.

ADA 364864 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)