The manner in which the Allied military forces of the First World War were coordinated has had an enormous influence upon subsequent alliance doctrines. The necessity for cooperative military efforts, the detailed coordination of all national resources and the interaction of military decisions with the entire fabric of society were lessons painfully learned during the first total war. Yet, while these lessons are generally accepted, their actual application during the First World War has been distorted by the self-serving participants and observers who were outraged at the destruction and misery which accompanied the war. The exact methods by which the Entente Powers controlled and coordinated their military might are examined herein. From informal and imprecise methods of personal diplomacy to the formal structure of the Supreme Allied War Council, four distinct periods of positive relationships existed. During the first period, military cooperation was based upon the personal prestige of General Joseph Joffre. Joffre filled a vacuum in political leadership by influencing the military strategies of England, Russia and Italy along coincidental lines. In 1916, the political leaders reasserted their power and relieved Joffre. They further instituted a system of unity of command on the Western Front by subordinating the British commander. This system soon failed and brought discredit upon the politicians who had devised it. During the period which followed, little in the way of cooperative military effort was attempted. The Supreme Allied War Council, with its Board of Permanent Military Representatives was instituted as a formal system to ensure positive military cooperation and political control in late 1917. However, the political limitations of the Council and the adamant opposition of the field commanders kept this organization from achieving its full potential. Finally, after a series of military reverses, an overall commander of Allied forces -a Generalissimo- was named. The appointment of Marshal Foch over Field Marshal Haig and General Petain was made only eight months before final victory. Because this solution was in effect at the conclusion of hostilities, its importance has been greatly exaggerated and insufficient examination of the problems and solutions of the preceding arrangements has been made. Using the historical method of investigation, this thesis attempts to reexamine the evolution of the military coordination systems employed throughout the war. The sources relied upon include the extensive literature on the Great War-personal accounts, the official histories, and the diverse interpretations of the intervening year. One source used which has been hitherto unavailable is the Private Papers and Diaries of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. These penetrating and revealing original documents have been held in privileged confidence for more than fifty years by the Field Marshal's son. Their release allows a more balanced account and interpretation of military cooperation during the war. The conclusions reached by this study are that the actual operation of the Entente military machinery was haphazard and extremely vulnerable to personal and political pressure. In fact, the personalities of Joffre, Haig, and Petain influenced the actual conduct of operations much more than has previously suspected. In conjunction with this fact, the growing importance of the British armies in France during the concluding two years made Haig a primary factor in the final result. Another conclusion is that the nascent Allied Supreme War Council was a potentially important system which could have been developed to direct political blunders and the opposition of the field commanders doomed this experiment to a peripheral role.

ADA 067459 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)