The foreign policy of the United States reflects the importance with which the independence and welfare of the emerging nations are regarded. Military policy contributes to foreign policy in these countries through the activities of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Missions. These U. S. advisory personnel are able to support both the welfare and independence of underdeveloped countries through the concept of civic action. Civic action involves the use of military forces on projects that will raise the socio-economic standards in underdeveloped countries. Suitable projects are improvements in the fields of education, training, public works, agriculture, communications, health, sanitation, and public administration. The purpose of civic action is two fold: first, it is intended to raise the standard of living; second, it is intended to improve the relationship between the participating military forces and the indigenous population. Ideally, the participation of U. S. military personnel in civic action in underdeveloped countries is limited to advice and assistance. These MAAGs and Missions, augmented as necessary, sponsor civic action projects in coordination with the Ambassador and other members of his Country Team. There have been many civic action projects in underdeveloped countries in recent years, and increasing national interest indicates that there will be many more in the future. In the past, there have been successes and failures in civic action operations; both successes and failures are likely to occur in the future. But, learning from past activities is a logical method of improving those operations that are to follow. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze objectively the civic action activities in selected underdeveloped countries. From this analysis the features that have contributed to either successes or failures are isolated. These features are then translated into guidelines to encourage the repetition of the beneficial characteristics and to discourage the use of those that have been worthless or detrimental. These guidelines are intended for the future use of MAAGs and Missions in their execution of civic action. Civic action case studies in the Philippines, Malaya, Korea, Laos, and Vietnam are analyzed. In the Philippines, Magsaysay integrated civic action into the counterinsurgency operations against the HOKs. He granted land to the reeducated dissidents to counter the Communist battlecry of "land for the landless" and to improve the economy of his country. This was accomplished by the EDCOR Plan under which the resettled HUKs received tracts of previously unused land. Civic action was also employed to gain the support of loyal peasants. These activities included the supervision of honest elections and the provision of legal advice in land courts for those peasants who held doubtful titles to their land. Civic action was successful in the Philippines for two fundamental reasons- it was honestly and ably administered and it was directed to the needs of a receptive people. The British employed civic action in Malaya as a contributory method of suppressing Communist insurgency. They resettled over a half million Chinese squatters to separate the guerrillas from their logistic sources. Civic action was incorporated into these resettlement projects. The British emphasized the application of civic action at the "grass roots" level from which Communist insurgency seems to so frequently spring. The term "new villages" evolved from this application of civic action to improve social and economic conditions in the resettlement projects. In this manner the British demonstrated the use of civic action as an element of a coordinated effort to suppress Communism, elevate the economy, and win public support for the established government. U. S. military forces in Korea administer civic action through the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Program. This program is a good example of civic action-type foreign aid being used to contribute to U. S. foreign policy. The AFAK Program serves as a model for other similar civic action activities, and it provides a good example of the rapport that can be established between U. S. forces and an indigenous population. The case study of Laos illustrates the difficulty of achieving successful civic action in an environment of government instability. The many and frequent changes of government resulted in a series of civic action programs. This discontinuity of administration seriously hampered the improvement of socio-economic benefits. Another deterrent was the national religion of Buddhism which advocates self-denial and passivity. In Laos, these inhibitive social factors were reinforced by impoverished economic conditions and an unstable government. Consequently, the acceptance of civic action was understandably slow. Civic action has been administered in Vietnam by both the MAAG and the Vietnamese armed forces. The MAAG efforts have been well supported by the U. S. Operations Mission and by outside military augmentation. The deployment of Mobile Training Teams from Okinawa and the United States increased the civic action capability in the four tactical corps areas. Further augmentation was obtained through the test of a concept- that of the Engineer Control and Advisory Detachment (ECAD). Two ECADs were made available to the HAAG by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam. They conducted extensive civic action with considerable success. While the civic action activities of U. S. military agencies have accomplished much, those of the Vietnamese have been less successful. This has been due to a lack of leadership, technical ability, and command interest. Of course, in many cases these shortcomings are the result of the tactical demand for troops for strictly military duties. In other cases the reasons have not been so justifiable. As a result of analyzing the five case studies of civic action, ten guidelines were developed for the use of officers assigned to duty with MAAGs or Missions. They are listed below in a probable chronological order of application. 1. Undertake self-preparation to become familiar with the concept of civic action and to learn as much as possible about the host country. 2. Understand the U. S. national objectives relative to the host country and how civic action fits into the country plan. 3. Determine the specific needs of the people and orient civic action to those needs. 4. Don't be handicapped by a restrictive definition of civic action. 5. Coordinate with other U. S. agencies in the area and work through command channels within the Country Team. 6. Be aware of the external assistance available for civic action. 7. Make every effort to get indigenous military forces to participate in civic action. 8. Be prepared for reluctant acceptance and a lack of interest in continuing civic action projects by the recipients. 9. Don't hesitate to actively participate in civic action projects. 10. Ensure that measures are taken to publicize civic action to indigenous civilians.

ADA 365714 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)