The purpose of this thesis was to determine the adequacy of current U.S. Army doctrine relative to encircled units and breakout operations in view of the problems encountered by the 31st Regimental Combat Team, U.S. 7th Infantry Division, on the eastern side of the Changjin [Chosin] Reservoir in North Korea from 26 November to 2 December 1950. Tactical doctrine was defined as authoritative guidance published by Headquarters, Department of the Army, pertaining to the employment of U.S. Army units in combat. The historical and descriptive method", of research were used to ascertain the background, training and preparation of the 7th Infantry Division prior to entry into combat in Korea; combat experience of the 7th Infantry Division prior to deployment of the 31st Regimental Combat Team to the Changjin Reservoir; and finally, the period of 26 November to 2 December 1950 during which the 31st Regimental Combat Team was encircled by an estimated two Chinese Communist Divisions and attempted breakout operations which ended in the force ceasing to exist as a military unit. Analysis of the action determined that the combat action of the 31st Regimental Combat Team provided an excellent example of the problems encountered by a unit which became encircled by the enemy and attempted breakout operations. Also, that the problems encountered by the force are applicable in today's tactical environment. Current tactical doctrine contained in U.S. Army Field Manuals was found inadequate. The major problems encountered by the 31st Regimental Combat Team of attrition of combat power due to combat losses, increasing reliance on fire support external to the encirclement, and command actions when communications with external forces were lost, are not included in present doctrine. Conservation of resources available within the encirclement and the necessity for junior leaders to readily assume increased responsibility if their seniors become casualties, is other areas requiring emphasis. Commanders and headquarters senior to the encircled force must aggressively anticipate needs, and render all possible assistance to the encircled force. The doctrine currently contained in Department of the Army Field Manual 7-20, The Infantry Battalions, (1969), pertaining to the conduct of breakout operations was determined to be comprehensive and adequate except as it pertains to evacuation of incapacitated personnel with the breakout force. However, as currently published this doctrine is only applicable to infantry battalions. The study recommends: 1.) Doctrine for encircled forces be published in an Army Field Manual applicable to all combat, combat support, and combat service support units. 2.) Additional doctrinal guidance be provided concerning the conduct of combat operations and supply economy by forces once encircled and prior to commencing breakout and/or relief operations. 3.) Specific doctrinal guidance be provided regarding the evacuation of incapacitated personnel with a breakout force when the probability exists that such evacuation will jeopardize the success of the breakout. 4.) Other historical examples of encircled forces and breakout operations be reviewed to confirm the validity of the conclusions reached in this study.

ADB006731 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)