The sixteen division force decision is analyzed primarily from the military perspective of its originator, General Abrams. However, the perspectives of the Congress, of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army, and of the Army staff planners who must make that decision work were also vital aspects of the decision and are accordingly analyzed. The significance of the sixteen division force decision, which was broached to Congress in early 1974 and presented as programmed force in the February 1975 budgetary request for FY 1976, lies in the fact that the Army is asking to increase its number of divisions from thirteen to sixteen without requesting an increase in its end strength of 785,000. The last time the Army had sixteen divisions was in 1964, when the end strength was 969,000, almost 200,000 more than now. The decision is therefore part of the impetus for a major restructuring of the Army which will produce more combat units, fewer support units, and fewer headquarters. The "tooth-to-tail" is being adjusted in favor of the "tooth." The basis for the decision was not carefully worked out staff study, but rather an estimate of the situation--roughly analogous to a commander's use of the factors of METT (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available). The factors of mission and enemy, or the strategic response of general purpose forces (primarily ground forces) to a given threat, are derived from considerations of the Soviet military evolution since World War II, the perception that the American role in Southeast Asia was less than satisfactory, and the implications of those two factors for all contingencies, but particularly for the primary one, NATO. Essentially, the Soviets have achieved nuclear parity to a degree which undercuts any American option to escalate from ground combat to a tactical or strategic nuclear "solution." More reliance is therefore placed on being able to control a conventional attack with conventional ground forces, forces in which the Soviets are clearly superior in the NATO arena. The "trip-wire" strategy, if it existed, does no longer. NATO is the basis for ground forces sizing and planning because of its value and because of the very clear threat of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact nations in the European theatre. American ground forces are planned on the basis of being able to respond simultaneously to this major threat as well as to one minor one. Steady Soviet improvements over the last ten years in quality and quantity of ground forces and the American drawdown from Vietnam have degraded the military balance to an extent which requires a clear signal by us that the drawdown is over. The increasing multi-polarity of the international arena also increases the likelihood of using the three new divisions in response to a minor contingency. The terrain and weather, the political constraints, which were analyzed before deciding to attain sixteen divisions without increasing the end strength of 785,000, were chiefly two. The first was that 785,000 was about all that the traffic would bear it was what the Army thought it could recruit into an all-volunteer force and it was seen as all the Congress would let them recruit. The second constraint was strong Congressional concern that the Army, which was thought to be primarily a "labor-intensive" force, was too support heavy, too much involved with equipment, particularly in research and development, This acted as a constraint because it made one option, that of converting the Army to a more equipment and support-oriented, "capital-intensive" force less viable. Congress, it was felt, simply would not support this option without making drastic reductions in manpower, These fiscal "savings," however, would not be put back into the capital, or support structure. The factor of troops available, or the tactical and managerial consequences of the decision, is internally the most visible one because it means that the Army must restructure its assets and manage them more intensively than ever before. Essentially, as the Army Chief of Staff General Weyand has stated, it means "finding new ways of doing business." It also means that, because the restructuring has been speeded up by the August 1974 Nunn Amendment, trying to attain sixteen divisions by the end of FY 1976 will cause short term degradation of Army readiness. Tactically, the force will be lighter, but, because of this, it will also get to the fight sooner. There are some short-term risks in readiness attendant to attaining sixteen divisions quickly without increasing the end strength of the Army. Nevertheless, by taking that initiative, the Army has re-established its credibility with the Congress, which has already responded by, for the first time in five years, not reducing the Army's end strength, has reoriented the Army internally toward more intensive management of its assets, as well as toward its primary mission of fighting, and has provided a signal to adversaries and allies alike that there is an irreducible minimum to American resolve.

ADA 006176 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)