This study examines the escalation rates and intensity levels of US/ USSR post-WW II confrontations in relation to the number of strategic nuclear weapons available to these nations to determine if a relationship exists. That is, have strategic nuclear weapons effected the rate of escalation or peak level of intensity of the post-WW II US/USSR confrontations. The study concludes that, while the role of strategic nuclear weapons has been insignificant in effecting either the intensity level or escalation rate of US/USSR confrontations, strategic nuclear weapons are an important factor in the pursuit of confrontation avoidance politics by the US and USSR since 1962. However, once a US/USSR confrontation becomes unavoidable and is enjoined, strategic nuclear weapons become a tool of force employed within the conceptual framework of a confrontation strategy. As this strategy involves ever increasing measures of escalation with the goal of persuading the opponent to concede and begin the de-escalation process, there is the ever present danger of miscalculation or misperception by the actors and a resorting to the use of nuclear weapons with catastrophic results. Herein, lies the danger of nuclear weapons and the necessity for understanding their role and bringing them under control. This study provides the reader with a better understanding of the role of nuclear weapons. Hopefully, it will influence others to accelerate efforts to bring nuclear weapons under effective control.

ADB 006687 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)