This study analyzes the German failure to decisively conclude Operation Barbarossa by capturing Moscow, asking whether this failure was the result of disregard for the principle of the objective. The failure at Moscow was the first significant setback for the German Army in World War II. The role played by the notion of the objective in the pre-World War II German Army is investigated along with the backgrounds and personalities of the principal military and civilian leaders involved in the campaign. These background chapters provide the insight needed to understand the relationship that existed between the tactical commander and his superiors during the detailed planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa. The question of whether the German Army of 1940-1941 subscribed to the principle of the objective and properly applied the principle is examined in detail in the study. Extensive use is made of personal diaries and memoirs of German general officers directly involved in the campaign in Russia. Conclusions reached in the study are: 1. The principle of the objective evolved differently in the German Army than in the United States Army but both schools of thought were basically the same. The notion of the objective was well established in the German Army prior to World War II. 2. Moscow was a decisive objective in the campaign because it required the Red Army to stand and fight rather than withdraw deeper into the Soviet Union. Rather than risk serious confrontations, the military leaders of the German Army acquiesced to Hitler and complied with his orders knowingly risking strategic defeat by disregarding the military principle of the objective. 3. The leadership element of the German Army of 1940 and 1941 understood and attempted to apply the principle of the objective throughout Operation Barbarossa and at Moscow in particular. Hitler did not share their views. 4. Political and economic goals were placed ahead of military objectives at the expense of the ultimate objective-destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle.

ADA 042869 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)