The purpose of this study is to establish the effects of cavalry operations, both Federal and Confederate, on the battles which occurred during the Chancellorsville Campaign. The primary source used for the study was the War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Confederate and Union Armies. The Chancellorsville Campaign, fought by the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, during the spring of 1863, was a major Federal offensive. Its purpose was to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia and to force it to retreat from Fredericksburg, Virginia. The campaign involved nearly 200,000 soldiers of both sides and produced over 30,000 casualties. Ultimately, the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker was defeated by General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and as a result abandoned its offensive and retreated to its previous positions north of the Rappahannock River. The Federal Army possessed a large numerical advantage and though initially on the offensive it was forced to retreat by a smaller army. In analyzing the campaign, several factors emerge which help to explain Lee's victory and Hooker's defeat. One of these factors is the way in which each commander utilized his cavalry assets. The hypothesis to be tested in the study is that Lee's employment of cavalry forces contributed to his victory, while Hooker's use of cavalry was a significant factor in producing his defeat. Among the major conclusions of the study are: 1) Federal cavalry operations produced no beneficial effects for the Army of the Potomac. 2) The failure of Federal cavalry to produce significant results at Chancellorsville was due to the methods used by General Hooker to employ his cavalry resources. 3) The Federal defeat at Chancellorsville was due, in part, to the lack of adequate cavalry support on the main battlefield. 4) Confederate cavalry was properly employed at Chancellorsville. 5) The effectiveness of Confederate cavalry operations contributed significantly to Lee's victory. The study is concluded with a review of the lessons regarding cavalry employment provided by the Chancellorsville Campaign and with some general thoughts on the use of cavalry forces on the modern battlefield.

ADA 029993 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)