This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The loss of Vicksburg in the American Civil War was a mortal blow to the Confederacy in that it split the south in two and resulted in the opening of the Mississippi River to the Union forces. During the Campaign for Vicksburg Major General Ulysses S. Grant, leading a Union army engaged Lieutenant General John O. Pemberton, commanding a Confederate army, and proceeded to win one of the most brilliant m1l1tary successes in history. A distinct contrast in aggressiveness appeared to exist between Grant and Pemberton during this campaign; because once Grant landed his army in Confederate territory, he retained the initiative and kept Pemberton at his mercy. Pemberton was unable to overcome the difficulties he experienced and received little help from outside his command. Finally, because of despair among his men, he surrendered Vicksburg to the Union on July 4, 1863 after forty-seven days of miserable siege warfare. The basic problem in the study was to determine if General Pemberton, even though completely defeated by Grant, ever applied the principle of the offensive during his defensive operations and to determine why he failed to gain any freedom of action during the Vicksburg Campaign. Certain "actions" that can be taken by a commander relative to the principle of the offensive in the defense and certain "factors" which may prevent his taking these actions are identified and employed in the analysis. Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg applied the principle of the offensive against Grant's initial probes into Mississippi and against Federal cavalry raids into Vicksburg area. 2.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg did not apply the principle of the offensive against Grant's army during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg (May 1 to July 4, 1863). Several of General Pemberton's subordinate commanders, however, did apply the principle during this same period. 3.) The primary reasons for Pemberton's failures with respect to the application of the principle of the offensive were his lack of intelligence resulting from his lack of cavalry and interference with his command decisions from higher authority.

ADA 258517 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)