This thesis provides a comparative policy-process perspective of Vietnam intervention. It is comparative in the sense that the Eisenhower administration's policy process in the 1954 Indochina crisis is used as a basis to compare the Johnson administration's policy making which led to intervention in 1965. The study's analysis centers on the policy processes of the two administrations and how the differences in their policy making contributes to the explanation of the opposite decisions on military intervention. The study's conclusion is that the Johnson policy process was comparatively exclusionary and, as a result, not effective in formulating Vietnam policy. In comparison to the more open Eisenhower policy making, in the Johnson administration dysfunctional policy-making elements are identified in the executive bureaucracy, the role of the President, other policy makers, and Congress. As a result the policy process did not sustain a thorough evaluation of the alternatives and the cost of being an intervenor. The major impact of the study is to provide another approach to the analysis of Vietnam policy and further the understanding of why the United States resorts to force in foreign affairs. It should stimulate further study of the policy process and its application to future interventionist policy development.

ADA 057827 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)