The purpose of this study is to discuss the role of arms limitations at the strategic nuclear level between the United States and the Soviet Union as it contributes to arms control in general and to strategic stability in particular. This approach to arms control/arms limitations is not designed to be technical in nature. To judge the usefulness of past and on-going strategic arms limitation talks a conceptual framework through which one can assess the utility or non-utility of arms control measures is discussed. In assessing arms control and strategic stability this study examines U.S. strategic goals and objectives; the rapid and continuous growth of Soviet strategic nuclear force capabilities the SALT I agreements; the objectives/utility of strategic nuclear forces in both a military and political sense; the strategic nuclear balance; and the utility of follow on strategic arms agreements. The hypothesis of this study suggest that instead of enhancing strategic stability and promoting moderation of competition in strategic armaments-the SALT I accords and post SALT I Soviet behavior illustrate what may be a quest for Soviet strategic superiority rather than parity and a mobilization for war rather than detente and peaceful co-existence.

ADA 057971 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)