This paper will examine China's decision to support Pakistan during the East Bengal crisis in 1971, in order to determine whether that decision constituted a contradiction in the light of Peking's previously professed support for revolutionary movements, or "wars of national liberation". Stated explicitly, the hypothesis which is to be explored is that China's support of Pakistan rather than of Bangladesh is not contradictory when viewed in the context of the entire spectrum of foreign policies which Peking has pursued since 1949, and when the exigencies of the international situation faced by the PRC in 1971 are considered. It is natural to expect some degree of consistency between a government's pronouncements and its behavior. If no such consistency exists, or if we are too often taken by surprise by the manner in which a nation reacts to a given situation, then quite possibly our own image of that nation's policy objectives is faulty and needs to be re-examined lest it lead us to make a serious miscalculation. By isolating and examining this one instance of a seemingly contradictory foreign policy decision by the PRC, and attempting to see what it might reveal about Peking's perception of the risks, costs and benefits involved, we may be able to evaluate the validity of our own images of China's foreign policy goals and the means that she is likely to use to achieve them.

ADA 090874 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)