Two months before World War I ended, the President of the United States, along with the leaders of Great Britain, France, Italy, and several other allied nations, committed nearly 20,000 soldiers to war in North Russia. Almost a year after the armistice on the Western Front Allied troops were still fighting in the snowy wastes of a far off, strange land, for unclear and ambiguous reasons. This thesis examines the background to the intervention, the relationships between the Allies, the Allied military operations, and the reasons for the ultimate failure of the North Russian Expeditionary Force. The study focuses on the decisions that led to the intervention at Archangel, the command relationships between the primary military and political players, and the impact of the unique characteristics of each of the Allied forces on the conduct of combat operations against the Bolsheviks. Source material for this study has been taken from the accounts of American, British, and Canadian officers, after-action reports, and unit histories. Other information comes from French, Canadian, Australian, English, and American sources. The impact of the extremes of weather, vastness of the country, ubiquitous nature of the enemy, length of supply lines, lack of fire support, confusion of the command structure, and distinct motives of each of the Allied forces all combined to spell the inevitable failure of the Allies in North Russia. This thesis scrutinizes each of these elements and concludes by discussing those crucial factors that influenced the coalition warfare effort.

ADB 061168 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)