On the night of Wednesday, 28 April 1965, at approximately 1900 hours, the Sixth Marine expeditionary unit commenced operations in the Dominican Republic. For the first time since 1924 the United States Marines were back in that troubled nation. Before this confusing chapter in the history of United States and Latin America relations was over, an additional 22, 000 U.S. paratroopers and Marines were committed to combat on that small island. This action ended the "Good Neighbor" policy of non-intervention in Latin America for the United States and established a precedent for intervening in the affairs of any Latin American country that threatens to become a "second Cuba." The general peace and relatively democratic governments that the Dominican Republic has experienced since the 1965 crisis illustrate the purpose of this study. Simply stated, that purpose is to show that, in spite of post-Vietnam trauma, a tightly controlled military intervention in Latin America can successfully end an armed insurrection with favorable political results. This success can be gained even if the decision to intervene was based on confusing and inaccurate field reports; as was the case in this crisis. The essential conclusions drawn from this study are: (a) if the United States must intervene it must do so rapidly and massively with its Latin American allies in order to prevent any side in the conflict from gaining a quick military advantage; (b) Once in the country the U.S. must maintain as neutral a stance as possible; (c) Washington must absolutely keep its military means subordinated to a clearly stated, attainable, and negotiated political end; (d) rather than attempting to destroy the insurgent, intervening forces should isolate him on the ground and then include him in negotiations; (e) time must be allowed to work against the contending parties and in the favor of the intervening regional peacemakers. The U.S. response to the Dominican crisis clearly shows that the often violent forces of change in Latin America can be controlled by intervention with the relative certainty of gaining a political solution acceptable to everyone. Whether or not the approach used to resolve the crisis can be used elsewhere in the region is debatable. However, in a rapidly deteriorating crisis, knowledge of how this success was achieved could help the policy maker or strategist in devising a rapid, decisive course of action, after other more peaceful efforts have failed.

ADA 133268 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)