Beneath a nuclear umbrella insurgency has proliferated amongst the developing nations of the world. Insurgency if unchecked poses a threat to the stability of the world. To maintain stability, developed nations might have to support developing nations to combat insurgency. This support should be based upon common principles of insurgency, counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency support to the host nation. Using the principles of revolutionary warfare evolved by the British Staff College, Camberley, the author has examined the validity of those principles. He has found that the insurgent does not have complete control over the subjective principles such as cause, popular support, leadership, external support, and creation of an alternate society. However, the insurgent does have initiative in the objective principles of choice of terrain, engaging in protracted war, and gaining intelligence. The author is of the view that principles of counterinsurgency should be mainly objective in nature but directed towards attaining the subjective principle of popular support. The author feels that, as insurgencies are of long duration, an early enunciation of the national aim to deal with the problem, planning and organization for a long term perspective, and harnessing the total potential of the country as a national approach is essential for quicker counterinsurgency success. He stresses that insurgents should be isolated in order to bring them back to democracy. In providing counterinsurgency support to a host nation, the author feels that the aiding nation should first analyze the principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency in operation in the host nation. He has explained that enduring common interests, national will, and minimum visible support are necessary principles to be followed in host nation counterinsurgency support. The author has arrived at the principles of insurgency, counter-insurgency and counterinsurgency support to a developing nation through a process of historical analysis. The author accepts that the principles are not exhaustive to cover all insurgencies, yet they serve as a basis for actions by the counterinsurgent.

ADA 172533 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)