This study is an historical analysis of the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War from the perspective of the intelligence available to General Douglas MacArthur prior to the Chinese Communist counteroffensive. It answers whether MacArthur should have known his drive toward the Yalu River would provoke the Chinese Communists' overt military intervention in the Korean War on 25 November 1950. This thesis considers the significant, credible intelligence available to the various levels of the US military and national intelligence and the resulting estimates of Chinese Communist intent significantly affected the national and military policy makers. The evidence is presented chronologically and is considered on three levels: strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence emanated from international and diplomatic sources. Operational intelligence was obtained in the Far East, particularly the People's Republic of China, but not within the boundaries of either North or South Korea. Tactical or battlefield intelligence was the confirmation or repudiation of analyses derived from strategic and operational intelligence. Prior to MacArthur's final offensive in November 1950, he received sufficient significant and credible intelligence to indicate a Chinese Communist intent to intervene in the war. MacArthur knew of key national intelligence indicators of a hardening of Chinese national resolve. He had accurate information about the relocation of large numbers of Chinese Communist combat forces to Manchuria and into North Africa. MacArthur also had the battlefield intelligence that clearly indicated Chinese involvement prior to their 25 November counteroffensive. The Chinese Communist intent was clear. The study concludes that General MacArthur is culpable for his failure or refusal to accept valid Chinese Communist warnings.

ADA 184714 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)