The format of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 is an introduction; Chapter 2 surveys the history of chemical warfare and the evolution of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS); Chapter 3 reviews the Soviet offensive use of chemicals; Chapter 4 presents a fictional scenario to illustrate the communications problems of the light fighter under combat conditions in a tropical climate; and Chapter 5 assimilates key scenario communication events with applicable governmental and field studies conducted since 1969. The thesis scenario logically discusses and portrays today's chemical equipment and NBC communication training. The scenario's intent is to challenge a leader to analyze how a unit could be properly trained and maneuvered in today's low- intensity chemical battlefield. Lessons learned from this study are: 1) Communications suffer significantly in the chemical environment because of the following factors: (a) exhaustion of leaders, (b) leadership behavioral changes, and (c) the increased periods when no one is in charge. 2) Face-to-face communication is only one-half as effective in the chemical environment as in a no-threat environment and 38% of all radio messages must be repeated while in MOPP4. 3) Battalion TOC efficiency suffers significantly in a chemical environment because of the following: (a) written work and radio/telephone communications are subject to 40% more errors, (b) organic M51 Shelters cannot house a functional staff, and (c) more reliance is placed on gathering intelligence instead of planning for mission execution. 4) Opposed amphibious assaults by soldiers in a tropical environment wearing MOPP4 are judged medically impossible. 5) Training is the single most important factor in preparing to fight and win on a chemical battlefield. A 'light fighter' can communicate in a chemical environment. How effective the communication is depends on the amount of unit and individual chemical training and the physical conditioning of the unit.

ADA 198580 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)