The Army has begun the process of relearning and integrating deception into doctrine and operations. There is a lack of clarity concerning exactly what deception is and how it should be used. The state of doctrine and training both appear to be in need of aggressive review and modification. History is clear on the lessons of deception. It is a potent combat multiplier that can be decisive in gaining surprise and initiative. Historical examples show that the costs of these operations are generally less than one would expect. The risk appears relatively low as well. Benefits, on the other hand, are uniformly significant, especially when compared to cost and risk. The 1989 U.S. Army White Paper on Deception attempted to set the azimuth for deception integration. It failed to provide the urgency and priority required to initiate an action of this magnitude. This thesis uses the premise of "What the White Paper should have said" to explore the subject. The paper makes recommendations based on interviews with senior defense officials, including Generals Starry, Cavazos, and Livsey; Dr. Edward Luttwak, and several experts in the field of deception. The recommendations address doctrine development, parallel training, and the integration of deception into planning. Training events such as BCTP, the NTC, JRTC, and ARTEPs must all integrate deception as a central point of concern if deception is to become a uniform and effective component of Army doctrine and operations.

ADA 230184 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)