This study analyzes the nature and extent of use of the Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) in Soviet operational and tactical decision making. It discusses the historical and military- scientific forces that compel the soviets to use mathematical methods for solving complex battlefield problems. It details the methodology through which the Soviets arrive at combat potentials for armament and how these potentials are aggregated for force correlations. It reviews the relationship between force correlations and Soviet mathematical models and describes how both are used to support the commander's operational decision. The study concludes with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the COFM methodology. The author finds that COFM is an effective force optimizer that also relieves the commander of many burdensome assessments during his decision process. However, COFM was also found to suffer distinct limitations and weaknesses. Chief among these was its inability to quantify many of the more important battlefield variables that significantly influence the course and outcome of modern combat and operations. Among the author's recommended areas for further research is the evaluation of a COFM-like methodology for U.S. Army use in the field.

ADA 227427 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)