This study is an historical analysis of the 27th Division in World War II. The performance of that division is illustrative of all divisions which were mobilized in 1940-1941 from the National Guard. The focus was on personnel, training, organization, military education of the leadership, and external influences. A number of conclusions resulted from this study. As was the case with all National Guard divisions, the Congress denied adequate funds to equip or train them to a standard which would enable them to function in war. Once mobilization began the Army systematically disintegrated the National Guard divisions sending its soldiers to service schools and to other newly activated divisions. The Army's theory that all soldiers were but interchangeable parts that could be inserted anywhere disregarded the major potential contribution of the National Guard. This contribution was the cohesion developed through years of close association. The senior leadership of the National Guard was a particular weakness in both tactical and technical matters and leadership. The upshot of the study is that the post-mobilization Army failed to capitalize on the strengths of the National Guard, its cohesion, while permitting its gravest vulnerability, the ineptitude of the senior leadership.

ADA 227332 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)