With the recent claimed phased withdrawal of the Vietnamese occupation forces from Cambodia in September 1989, it may appear that ASEAN has at last attained what it had sought for at the UN for the last decade since the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978. Finally, the single most worrisome threat is being removed. But the author contends that this is not the case. Even if the claimed withdrawal is true, there are many other problems that could threaten the stability of the region. These include both external threats that arise as a result of superpower and major power interests in the region, and the internal problems of ASEAN member-states. This study shows that Soviet interest/influence in the region is a significant potential indirect threat in the next five years. Presently, only a US military presence is able to counterbalance the Soviets. This US presence also serves to alleviate and attenuate the internal problems of the member-states to a significant extent. The internal problems include economic, racial, political, and social issues. Possible alternatives to a continued US military presence include a militarily strong Japan, or a Sino-Japanese alliance, both of which are undesirable to ASEAN. Other possibilities include an ASEAN defense pact, multilateral or bilateral defense agreements, security links with external powers, or a combination of these. However, none of these is wholly capable to replace the US presence in the Philippines. This study concludes that the presence of a US military is a lesser evil when compared to the situation without them. On balance, until ASEAN's concept of Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) is accepted by the superpowers and major powers, which the author thinks is unlikely, a continued US military presence in the region is essential for the continued stability and prosperity of ASEAN in the next five years.

ADA 229567 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)