This study analyzes how the U.S. Army has assimilated the Vietnam War's strategic military legacy. The investigation looks at the body of Vietnam "lessons" literature and the schools of thought regarding Vietnam's legacy. An examination of three institutional criteria discerns the Army's interpretation of Vietnam's strategic legacy. They are: professional journals, Army doctrine, and service school curricula. The investigation also employs a survey instrument to ascertain how the post-Vietnam generation of officers perceives Vietnam's legacy in relation to the existing schools of thought. Among the many conclusions which could be drawn from this investigation are: the Army has yet to define for itself what its Vietnam experience means in strategic terms. The Army consciously avoided a frank, comprehensive strategic reappraisal of its efforts in Indochina in the interest of returning to an exclusive focus on its central European mission. This strategic reorientation gave the Army a new sense of purpose and raison d'etre. However, it consciously and continually deflected the Army's attention away from a comprehensive analysis of the Vietnam War which addressed North Vietnamese strategy. The study concludes that no comprehensive postwar strategic assessment of Vietnam exists bearing the Army's imprimatur. Its absence constrains the Army's ability to conceptually address future Third World conflicts which employ revolutionary warfare to achieve their ends.

ADA 227466 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)