This thesis examines some of the reasons behind task force commanders inability to properly employ their direct fire systems during the conduct of offensive operations at the National Training Center (NTC). The thesis develops a set of criteria that is critical to the proper employment of direct fire systems during offensive operations. Using these criteria as a basis of analysis, this study reviews current NTC direct fire studies, doctrine and unit SOPs to identify shortfalls, discrepancies and problems that may affect the proper employment of direct fire systems during offensive operations. This thesis finds that NTC direct fire studies highlight numerous problems in direct fire performance based on the established criteria. These problems can be directly attributed to shortfalls and discrepancies in doctrinal manuals, unit SOPs and unit training practices. The most significant problems include the failure to emphasize the integration of direct fire systems as part of the scheme of maneuver and the failure to provide the necessary tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to do so. This thesis makes several recommendations on what changes should be made to doctrine, unit SOPs and unit training practices. It also points to several areas of future research that would benefit the continued analysis of this direct fire problem.

ADA 227386 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)