Regardless of military occupational specialty or pay grade, every Marine must be fully prepared to perform as a rifleman in a combat situation. This thesis studied three critical parameters which significantly influence the effectiveness of the individual combat skills training which every rifleman should receive. This type of training must replicate as closely as practicable the actual environmental and physical parameters expected to be encountered in a combat, or other "real world," situation. The closer the leader comes to creating these conditions, the more realistic his training is said to be. Realism is enhanced the more it involves the actual stresses and fears of the modern battlefield. Statutory safety rules and policies also play an important role in the mind of the leader as he attempts to develop and execute realistic training. The interdependence of these three elements requires the Marine Corps leader to harmonize their influence for maximum effectiveness. It is also his challenge to carefully weigh and balance the risks associated with making his unit's training more realistic. The author's study is apparently the first of its kind on this specific subject. His methodological approach to research included a review of all the existing documentary materials which established current training philosophy or policy, an analysis of the results of a survey sent to contemporary Marine Corps combat veterans, and a synopsis of interviews conducted with several international officers resident at the 1991 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Conclusions derived from this study were done on a Corps-wide basis. That is, qualitative analytical judgments were made for the average unit or school conducting routine combat skills training. In the author's opinion, training is not being conducted as realistically as it could be, the causes and countermeasures for battlefield stress are not being formally instructed, and existing safety policies are often unnecessarily restricting the quality of training. These conclusions do not indict the world's most elite fighting organization: they merely highlight areas within the training management environment which should be targeted for immediate attention and improvement.

ADA 242606 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)