Studies of most insurgencies and counterinsurgencies indicate that the struggle primarily has been directed towards winning the hearts and minds of the people. However, in almost every counterinsurgency, the security forces have played a significant role. Used adroitly, they have proved to be very effective, whereas their injudicious employment has benefitted the insurgents instead. The thesis presents case studies representing distinct geographical areas, varying from rural to urban warfare, differing in conflict duration and political motivation of insurgents. The four cases discuss the counterinsurgent response to the Tupamaros in Uruguay, FLN in Algeria, IRA in Northern Ireland, and the Viet Cong in Vietnam. The author has analyzed seven salient issues concerned with the role of security forces in counterinsurgency: contribution of security force operations towards national strategy of counterinsurgency and LIC; timing of employment of security forces and the nature of response; type of forces suitable for counterinsurgency operations; civic action and the security forces role in it; elimination of external support, especially from adjacent states; efficacy of employing security forces in combatting insurgency in another country; effect of national and international public opinion on actions of security forces.

ADA 255151 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)