The purpose of this study is to examine the need for the US Army to publish a distinct warfighting doctrine for irregular warfare in the new FM 100- 5, Operations. The emerging Army doctrine applies to the entire range of conflict, including 'operations short of war.' However, the current literature limits the Army to a support role in the level of conflict previously known as 'low intensity conflict.' Warfighting in the traditional sense is focused on the application of decisive combat, using a modified version of the 'AirLand Battle' doctrine. The thesis reviews the history and theory of irregular war as a distinct form of conflict that requires a different way of thinking about war. Characterized by protracted conflict and the integration of part-time, non- professional soldiers, the history of irregular warfare demonstrates consistent fundamental differences in the conduct of operations. The thesis concludes that the US Army must re-look the concept of irregular warfighting and campaign planning to be truly prepared to fight across the spectrum of war. Several fundamental principles are proposed to form a basis for drafting a separate chapter of the new doctrine.

ADA 258521 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)