This study investigates the relationship between NATO's decision to approach the problem created by the intermediate-range nuclear force superiority of the Soviets and the eventual signing of the INF Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union. The concept presented is that by adopting the dual track decision, (a track for negotiations and a simultaneous track for fielding U.S. INF missiles), the United States was eventually able to conduct arms negotiations from a position of strength. In this way a significant contribution to the INF Treaty negotiation process was made. The study examines the position of each principal prior to the dual track decision, examines the role each played in that decision, and looks at the actions taken following the implementation of the dual track decision. The study also presents the nuclear background of NATO, and also examines the INF negotiations in some detail. The conclusions provide the current status of the INF Treaty implementation and outlines some lessons which could be applied to future negotiations of this type.

ADA 258524 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)