This study investigates the Army's role in Naval gunfire support in light of current force reductions and changing military missions. The discussion focuses upon Naval gunfire training and predeployment planning and coordination for Naval gunfire support of contingency operations. During the initial stages of a contingency operation, the Army relies upon other services for fire support until sufficient Army field artillery and aviation attack assets are available. Fixed-wing air support and Naval gunfire provide this initial support. Naval gunfire for the Army was not coordinated during predeployment planning for operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, or Desert Shield. This study explains the Army's dependence upon the Marine Corps for the planning and coordination of Naval gunfire support. It promotes methods to decrease this dependence by improving the field artillery community's Naval gunfire training and awareness. The analysis addresses institutional training in the Army and Navy; Naval gunfire training at Army Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP); Army-Marine Corps Joint Naval gunfire training: and Joint cooperation in developing Army operations plans requiring Naval gunfire support.

ADA 258297 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)