This study investigates the automation problems that were encountered in support of personnel accounting and strength reporting during Operation DESERT STORM. This is of particular interest because of recent efforts to offset force structure shortfalls with automated initiatives. Operation DESERT STORM was the first conflict to put these initiatives to test. This thesis investigates how well personnel automation performed during the Persian Gulf War with focus on the problems needing resolution. This study first explains the personnel automation doctrine that existed at the time of Operation DESERT STORM. The study then explains how personnel automation was actually practiced during the war in contrast to doctrine. The study then describes the impacts or problems that resulted from the differences between doctrine and practice. And finally, the study presents recommendations of how to address personnel automation shortcomings. With an understanding of the problems encountered in Operation DESERT STORM, the personnel community may now work to find solutions. Learning from these problems, the personnel community may be able to build a better automated personnel system to meet the challenges of tomorrow's wars.

ADA 258287 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)