This study compares ammunition resupply doctrine for nondivisional units with the 75th FA Brigade experiences during Desert Storm. The intent is to analyze the reasons the 75th was nearly out of ammunition at the end of the war. A four step process identifies the inadequacies of current resupply doctrinal procedures, the impact of future distribution system improvements, the experiences of the 75th FA Brigade resupply operations and a synthesis of what doctrinal improvements should alleviate the potential of similar problems occurring in the future. The comparison determined the ammunition distribution system albeit with ongoing improvements was capable of sustaining the 75th FA brigade. The Desert Storm resupply problems occurred because the 75th did not properly prepare for wartime operations. Peacetime constraints prevented the unit from drawing ammunition as they would during war. The key to successful resupply operations is proper practice of resupply doctrinal procedures during peacetime training.

ADA 258296 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)