This paper investigates the role of planning management of transportation in deploying large forces by analyzing the VII (US) Corps' deployment in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991. The VII Corps deployed without benefit of a contingency plan and initially discounted the importance of transportation planning and management. As the deployment faltered, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe and 7th Army (USAREUR), directed his staff to assume planning and management responsibility. The study provides the historical context of the deployment, reviews deployment doctrine, compares doctrinal and actual organization in place, and recounts experiences that shaped the USAREUR's staff's concepts about moving large forces. It provides examples of how planning and management impacted the speed and time phasing of the forces. It provides evidence that doctrine worked when it was followed and that principles such as unity of effort, coordination, planning, and central management require more command attention during deployment. It outlines lessons to be learned and changes that should be made in technology and organizational equipment.

ADA 273988 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)