This study examines the principal combatants in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, (simply referred to as the October War), from a historical perspective to determine if political factors played a significant role in decision making on the battlefield. Using Clausewitz' concept of war is a means to a political end, not an end in itself, as a framework for analysis, the conduct of the war from the Egyptian and Israeli perspectives is described in detail. The October War is dealt with within this framework as opposed to a purely force-on-force description of military operations. Political limitations or constraints are evaluated on three levels. The first level is friction or relations among military leaders and staffs. The second political level is the relation of the military commands and senior staff with the political leadership of their respective countries. The third level of political constraints examined is the relation of the political leadership to outside actors, such as the superpowers. Implications for the future use of U.S. forces are analyzed. Lessons learned from the October War that continue to be relevant to U.S. planners are discussed.

ADA 272860 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)