This study investigates the formulation and implementation of U.S. military strategy to conduct joint and combined operations in the China Theater, concentrating on the period 1944-1945. Focusing on the interaction between the U.S. Joint Chiefs of staff, senior Allied leaders, and key U.S. commanders in China (Generals Joseph W. Stilwell, Albert C. Wedemeyer, Claire L. Chennault, and Admiral Milton E. Miles), this paper examines the process of developing joint and combined military objectives in the China Theater. This study finds that the U.S. military failed to accomplish desired military or political objectives in China. U.S. military strategy did not effectively link available resources with appropriate military objectives in support of U.S. national political objectives in China. The U.S. military failed to develop a coherent, coordinated strategy for effectively synchronizing U.S., British, Soviet, Nationalist and Communist Chinese military operations. Nor did the U.S. effectively synchronize U.S. Army, Army Air Force, and Navy operations. The primary causes of failure were unrealistic U.S. political objectives, incompatible Allied political objectives, inadequate logistics due to the demands of global war, and the actions of a determined foe, most of which were beyond the control of U.S. commanders on the scene.

ADA 272727 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)