This thesis analyzes the counterinsurgency efforts of the second Batista regime of Cuba, 1952-1958, using the "Sword Model," developed by Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel. The "Sword Model" is a paradigm developed to predict the probability of success of insurgencies by evaluating seven major criteria which are referred to as "dimensions." The thesis concludes that all seven dimensions were detrimental to the longevity of the Batista regime. The major contributors to Batista's failure were his lack of legitimacy and poor unity of effort within the government as well as between Cuba and the major intervening power, the United States. Weak democratic traditions in Cuban society and a biased international news media exacerbated the crisis. Based on the research conducted, it is believed that the "Sword Model" would have accurately predicted the outcome of the second Batista regime were it available during the 1950's. The "Sword Model" is therefore a viable tool in evaluating insurgencies.

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