This study examines the generalship of the French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, General Henri E. Navarre, during the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. This thesis employs a model of generalship from the United States Army doctrinal publication, Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, to analyze the actions of General Navarre. Through the application of the model, this thesis tests whether American doctrine supports or refutes the judgment of history. The conclusion reached is that the defeat of the French forces at the battle of Dien Bien Phu was largely due to a failure of senior level leadership on the part of General Henri E. Navarre.

ADA 284497 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)