This study examines the counterintelligence and security programs of the Manhattan Project, the United States acquisition of the atomic bomb, using the Department of Defense's Acquisition Systems Protection Program (ASPP) methodology. Using the ASPP methodology as presented in the April 1993 draft of Department of Defense Manual 5200.1, Acquisition Systems Program Protection, the study examines the Manhattan Project's: essential program information, technologies and systems (EPITS), foreign intelligence collection threat assessment, and countermeasures programs. The study, using today's criteria, concludes that the project's countermeasures program was marginally successfully because the project lacked a unifying security objective. Additionally, the project leadership failed to clearly identify and counteract the collection threat posed by wartime ally, the Soviet Union. The study determined that there are lessons learned from the historical case that are applicable to the contemporary ASPP. Lessons learned include; proposed doctrinal changes, threat assessment methodology and counterintelligence techniques and procedures.

ADA 284690 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)