This thesis investigates the main reasons for Slovenian secession political scene in former Yugoslavia prior to secession, how it actually happened, and the role of international diplomacy in recognizing the Republic of Slovenia. Slovenia is a forgotten survivor of the Yugoslav wars, even for many academics who work on southeastern Europe. Slovenes are rarely invited to conferences on solving the Yugoslav crisis. This is ironic because many from the former Yugoslav republics say that Slovenia started the dissolution process not only by seceding on July 25, 1991, but also by succeeding in developing its economy and civil society in the 198Os to the point where seceding may have been the only viable choice. This study explains that the Slovene independence was not the cause of Yugoslav disintegration, but rather the result of it. Author tries to answer the question whether the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia is primordial or instrumental, that is whether it is endemic to a region populated with South Slav peoples, or a product of a elite manipulation. The authors opinion is that the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia resulted from the irresponsible behavior of unscrupulous politicians, who had played the ethical card. Slovene willingness to live with other South Slav people in a common state was, after 1918 as well as after 1945, is an indisputable fact. But it is also a fact that Yugoslavia did not fall apart because of lack of unity, rather it happened because of intolerance and, even more, Serbian incapacity to accept Yugoslavia's ethnic and cultural diversity as a reality and a benefit. The only viable solution for Slovenes in 1991 was decision for the independent state. There were at least three contributing factors which helped Slovenes to declare its independence and survive; ethnic homogeneity, economic development, strong civil society, and decision supported by the majority of population to fight any kind of aggression on their newly declared state.

ADA 312818 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)