Events in the early l990s (namely the Berlin Wall coming down, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the failed Soviet coup attempt) forced the Department of Defense (DoD) to reassess its strategies, plans, and programs. Then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated an in-depth analysis of DoD from the 'bottom-up' to determine the future strategy direction, assess potential threats, tailor a force package accordingly, and develop a modernization timeline to equip said force package. The downsized Army of ten divisions was tailored to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives of thwarting aggression and promoting stability. This work examines whether this force structure can support the U.S. Army's NMS or if it merely performs per a political budget. The central theme asks the question: is the U.S. Army's force structure based on military strategy or based on a budgetary ceiling (headed downward)?

ADA 312167 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)