This study assesses the reliability of France as an American military ally. Its focus is upon French cooperation in four recent military operations: Operation El Dorado Canyon, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Provide Comfort (Phase I), and Operations Turquoise/Support Hope. Using the reliability criteria of political rhetoric, interaction between American and French forces, and the accomplishment of military objectives, the study concludes that France is likely to cooperate militarily when she agrees with both the military operation's objectives and means of achieving them and when the operation's sponsor is either France, herself, or a supranational organization, such as the United Nations. The study concludes the primary cause of a lack of military cooperation is France's perception of disregard for her freedom of action. The study further concludes that in the decision to cooperate, France's decision making conforms with the Balance of Threat Theory of International Relations. The theory specifies that confronted with two threats, the country will respond to the greater of the two. As the common leader of combined military operations, the United States occasionally poses a threat to France's freedom of action, thereby influencing the extent of France's cooperation which follows.

ADA 313137 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)