This narrative recounts the historical leadup to the Korean War and an operational account of some of the battles and operations during the first twelve months of the war. Its primary focus is on US employment of Republic of Korea (ROK) Army units during named operations and the conditions which the US military leadership tried to set in order to assure the ROK Army would succeed in its assigned missions. Issues, such as type of mission, assigned strength, equipment availability and status, terrain, and US augmentation to ROK Army units, are addressed in the context of each operation to determine if the US military leadership effectively employed ROK Army units. This thesis concludes that the many failures experienced by the ROK Army during the first year of the Korean War were due primarily to the lack of competent Korean military leadership and training and to the inexperience the average Korean foot soldier had as he went into combat, and were not a result of ineffective employment of ROK Army units on the part of the Eighth Army and the various corps and division commanders.

ADA 394892 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)