This study is designed to discover perceived issues that plague conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) integration on the battlefield. The research did in fact show that although operational and tactical integration of these disparate forces is overall successful, there exist several impediments to a truly joint and combined arms fight. The methodology used to conduct the analysis is based on the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) construct, and the most pertinent issues identified from the contemporary operational environment. Each facet of the DOTMLPF was underscored with examples from recent conventional force and special operations force integrated operations in Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and offers modest solutions to these matters. The recommendations affect doctrine, organization, training, material, and leadership; but find no cause to effect change or improvement to personnel and facilities within the Department of Defense. The recommendations are intended to increase the capabilities of both conventional forces and SOF, whether integrated or not. While this study identifies several matters that hamper truly synergistic integration, it is ultimately up to senior leadership within the military to continue further study and analysis, and overcome the inertia that hinders our joint warfighting capability.

ADA 436637 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)