In the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) found itself grappling with the means and mechanisms to resolve conflicts that had increasingly shifted from interstate to intrastate hostilities. The thesis examines four faults common to UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). During the 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations consistently acted with neutrality, versus impartiality, when confronting forces in grievous violation of the peace process. The UN failed to maintain international political will for its operations, thus leading to reduced force structures and reluctance to act decisively. The UN did not preserve the legitimacy for its missions, either in the eyes of the peacekeepers or the belligerent parties. Lastly, the UN failed to properly ensure unity of effort and unity of command, which had a profoundly negative impact on its operations. The result of these errors was the failed humanitarian effort in Somalia (1993), genocide in Rwanda that claimed 800,000 lives (1994), and the ethnic cleansing of eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina that climaxed at Srebrenica with the execution of 8,000 Muslim men and boys (1995). The final chapter makes several recommendations to prevent further UN failures of this magnitude in the future.

ADA 428884 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)